North Korea’s old benefactor returns

Bill Clinton this week made an “officially private” visit to North Korea to negotiate the release of two journalists (and it appears that he was successful, NYT). This is, of course, unrelated to the nuclear issue, but it should remind us that little progress has been made on this issue this year (or decade).

Understanding the internal politics of the North Korean regime is difficult. Kim may feel that the nuclear program is tied to regime legitimacy. Some things, however, are certain: Pyongyang’s nuclear program has been a cash cow for the regime, and the willingness of US presidents to let the multilateral process drag out and thereby increase the likelihood of proliferation has played into Kim’s hands. Once he has a working bomb, the game tilts in his favor, so he’s happy to patiently wait while Washington decides what to do.

Of course, Clinton is among a growing list of US presidents who have consistently misread Pyongyang’s intentions. So far these include at least Clinton, Jimmy Carter, and George W. Bush.

Will Obama join these sad ranks?

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Terrorism, proliferation, and world order

Terrorism and horizontal proliferation are the two gravest threats to a liberal domestic US – and the European internal postmodern paradise. Indeed, despite the growing gap in US and European worldviews, terrorism and proliferation are existential threats to both Europe’s postmodern paradise and the world of modern states. This helps us understand why US presidents–including the current one–must take both terrorism and proliferation very seriously.

US policymakers are obligated to protect US interests. During the Cold War, the US’ international interests were primarily based on nuclear deterrence, which was relatively simple (compared to now). In fact, the US interests could only be served if the US was the world’s dominant military power. Anything less would have left the US culture and institutions of domestic liberalism at existential risk. The need to be a dominant military power remains today, in large part because of the protection of economic interests worldwide. Without having the world’s largest navy, for example, US trade is subject to the whims of pirates and the holders of geographic choke points (like the Strait of Hormuz).

The old international order of state interaction is threatened by terrorism, which is carried out largely by non-state actors. Successful terrorism renders military power impotent, and it threatens open societies because it creates demand for autocratic responses from policymakers. The monopoly on violence–one of the three common criteria for sovereignty–is threatened by terrorism. Therefore, despite criticizing the Bush administrations policies for two years, the Obama administration has unapologetically continued The Activity Formerly Known As the War On Terror (with impunity). As evidence, consider Obama’s authorization of missile strikes in Pakistan (a sovereign state), his decision not to close GitMo, a lockstep continuation of Bush policies for Iraq and Afghanistan, and the coming executive order to continue Bush’s much criticized policy of allowing indefinite detention without charges. Despite having been a vocal critic of these Bush policies, and whether they have merit or not, Obama has had to abandon his old politicking simply because the risk of US anti-terrorism efforts failing is unthinkable–and right now, he doesn’t have a better plan. The ideological rhetoric of the previous administration aside, terrorism must be deterred at almost any cost.

Horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is the other key threat to the Western world order. As the European scholar-statesman Robert Cooper has argued, further horizontal proliferation would leave us “living in a radically different world.”

The Cold War eventually achieved nuclear stability and, through an understanding of the risks that instability might bring, this was extended to encompass conventional stability too. But the Cold War was a bipolar system managed by two rather cautious countries. . . . An international system in which several countries held nuclear weapons would no longer function along classical balance-of-power principles. . . . A nuclear armed minnow can still inflict unacceptable damage on a great power. . . .

Proliferation is a threat not just to this or that individual country, but to the whole system of interstate relations. (p. 63)

This is complicated by the fact that the states currently proliferating are appearing increasingly unstable (Iran is a case in point). The nuclear nightmare that is Pakistan should never be repeated. The risks are too great, especially since the prospect of nuclear weapons in an unstable state increases the chances of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists. Even without unstable states, proliferation of a Shi’ite state means arms races in the Middle East and an increased need for US missile defense at a time when that program is politically and technically very difficult. A multilateral approach is essential, but ultimately, the task of preventing proliferation will fall on the only state with the means to see it through. Not only is Europe not capable of solving the problem, but it is also politically unable to do so due to domestic culture and economic ties. Make no mistake, however: European security officials are desperately hoping that the US will once again protect their postmodern paradise, whatever the means it will require.

In short, terrorism and proliferation must be addressed because they threaten the very international world order on which stability is based. Says Kagan, the United States must sometimes live by “a double standard” to be able to preserve postmodern paradise amidst “Robert Cooper’s jungle” (p. 99).

See also NYT.

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North Korea: Another Failed Test?

Previous presidents have assumed that multilateral negotiations and aid incentives could persuade Pyongyang to play nice. These presidents ignored Kissinger’s maxim that “diplomats rarely pay for services already rendered,” and that failing to exert sufficient pressure “tempts [them] to drag out the negotiations in order to determine whether other unilateral gestures might be forthcoming” (p. 488). The pattern went like this: Kim acts belligerently, Washington invites him to 6-party talks and gives aid for promises of future action, Kim directs all resources toward military expansion, rinse and repeat (one exception: Bush’s efforts at financially squeezing the Stalinist regime have been clever and incisive; see FA). Bob Gates has complained that he’s “tired of paying for the same horse twice” (NYT), and the Obama Administration has indicated a willingness to break the pattern. (see NYT).

That’s good. Not only does Kim see the nuclear program as a good way to get free food, but he also sees it as crucial to his regime’s survival. In spite of his reputation as a belligerent uniltateralist, Bush trusted this problem to multilateral processes (6-party talks and UN resolutions). Given China’s fear of a flood of refugees and a unified, democratic, pro-US Korea on its border, Beijing has precluded any substantive measures by the UN. Further, Russia has demonstrated reluctance to allow the UN to chasten any autocracies, so we cannot expect a solution from the Security Council. After a successful DPRK nuclear test in 2006, the UNSC passed a toothless resolution, 1718, which Kim violated two months ago with impunity. The response was Resolution 1874, which China and Russia successfully limited to “recommendations” to search DPRK cargo vessels for arms (NYT). The measure also included more sanctions, which have proven so useful in the past.

That the resolution will go largely unheeded was evidenced by the US response, which will be tougher than most but falls short of enforcement, committing to confront but not board vessels suspected of carrying arms (NYT). The policy has merit – it may prevent direct conflict, will pressure countries to inspect North Korean vessels in port, and will increase the cost of proliferation. It is certainly an improvement over the aid-for-belligerence policy of previous administrations; however, proliferation has always been costly for the PRK, and other measures to slow the program, like Bush’s financial operations, have not dissuaded the regime. This policy, then, is unlikely to do more than slow the problem. Consider the first test of the policy: Burma, hardly likely to bow to international pressure on this issue, will be playing host to a suspect vessel this week, comprising the first failed test of Obama’s plan (NYT). What we have learned in the past decades are these key principles: Pyongyang will not abandon its nuclear ambitions unless its own existence is credibly threatened (or eliminated), and multilateral approaches both require and are made impotent by Chinese participation (see Kagan at WP).

I hope this policy is not Obama’s only plan: kick the can down the road to the next president. The Administration may have already lost credibility by making serious threats about Pyongyang selling nuclear technology to rogue states (they already did, to Syria, with impunity); and America’s credibility has been further weakened by a war of choice in Iraq, stretching US military resources and preparedness. Regardless, if Obama avoids addressing the issue he will have to deal with heightened domestic demand for missile defense, which will further complicate our relationships with Russia and China and remind voters of Obama’s campaign criticisms of the program.

See also Cha essay at FA, nervous Hawaiians at WP, O’Hanlon at Brookings.

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Ratifying the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

There is a popular opinion being circulated among the media and foreign policy intelligentsia that ratifying the Nuclear Test Ban treaty, as outlined in this NY Times editorial, will make it more difficult for NK and other would-be proliferators (e.g. Iran) to develop and test nuclear weapons. For this to be the case, however, either one of the following two assumptions would have to true: (1) North Korea would have to be interested in seeking international harmony and consensus, which it perpetually proves is far from the case;  or (2) the Test Ban treaty would have to possess the means of enforcing its stipulations, which it doesn’t. Naturally, then, ratifying the treaty will do little to deter North Korean ambitions to use its nuclear arsenal as a bargaining tool for security and aid.

Though it won’t have the impact experts and the media claim it will, ratifying the treaty can serve US interests. The treaty has already been signed and the US hasn’t tested a nuclear weapon in half a century, thus ratifying won’t hurt US interests. More importantly, there is even substance to the argument that, while falling short of deterring NK, ratifying the treaty could further US interests by justifying stronger opposition and legitimatizing international actions taken against treaty violators. Of course, a ratified treaty is only as valuable in so much as its signatories take significant, punitive actions against persistent, long-term violators. Given European and South Korean tendencies to blink, this additional legitimacy isn’t certain to lead to international consensus of action—but exhausting diplomatic options certainly stifles argument against it.

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Responding to North Korean Brinkmanship

North Korea continues to defy the international community by enriching uranium, testing nuclear weapons, and firing short-range missiles off its eastern coast. This behavior is yet another move in North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship. But why?

Many analysts believe North Korea is turning up its aggression due to internal issues regarding regime stability. Kim Jong Il is suffering from health problems and trying to galvanize support for his chosen successor, Kim Jong Un. But Pyongyang’s nuclear chest-thumping has deeper, more interest-oriented reasoning: to use its weapons programs to (a) win concessions from regional and western states in exchange for dialing down its policy of brinkmanship, and (b) to invest the international community in Pyongyang’s regime stability, from both internal and external pressures.

What does this mean for US policy? Regime change in the near term is implausible given the danger (and likelihood) of a nuclear and chemical weapons firesale if Kim Jong Il were to find his regime quickly dismantling. US policy should concentrate on managing NK stability while pursuing a multilateral consensus on coercive diplomatic engagement requiring the dismantling of North Korean nuclear weapons.

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